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Abstract 
We develop an empirical framework that links micro-liquidity, macro-liquidity and stock 
prices. We provide evidence of a strong link between macro-liquidity shocks and the returns 
of UK stock portfolios constructed on the basis of micro-liquidity measures between 1999-
2012. Specifically, macro-liquidity shocks, which are extracted on the meeting days of the 
Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee relative to market expectations embedded in 3-
month LIBOR futures prices, are transmitted in a differential manner to the cross-section of 
liquidity-sorted portfolios, with liquid stocks playing the most active role. We also find that 
there is a significant increase in shares’ trading activity and a rather small increase in their 
trading cost on MPC meeting days. Finally, our results emphatically document that during 
the recent financial crisis the shocks-returns relationship has reversed its sign. Interest rate 
cuts during the crisis were perceived by market participants as a signal of deteriorating 
economic prospects and reinforced “flight to safety” trading. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent global financial crisis has highlighted the importance of liquidity for the well-
functioning of financial markets. It is now well understood that a decline or, worse, 
evaporation of liquidity may cause large falls in asset prices that are not justified by their 
fundamentals. It may also cause the initialization of a downward spiral in asset prices, 
amplified by fire sales and deleveraging to meet margin calls and higher haircuts (see 
Brunnermeier, 2009, and Gorton and Metrick, 2010). Such feedback mechanisms can 
eventually pose a major threat to the stability of the financial system (Pedersen, 2009).  
Liquidity plays a crucial role both at the macro-level and at the micro-level. Macro-
liquidity mainly refers to the money supply provision by central banks and the availability of 
funds for financial markets’ participants, such as financial intermediaries. Central banks 
possess a set of monetary policy tools for managing macro-liquidity. The policy rate they 
determine is considered to be the benchmark for the term structure of interest rates. This is 
particularly true for the short-end of the yield curve (Kuttner, 2001). Moreover, the terms of 
liquidity provision to financial intermediaries affect to a great extent the broad money supply 
in the economy. Crucially for the focus of our study, the pivotal role of intermediaries in the 
modern financial system also implies that macro-liquidity shocks induced by changes in the 
monetary policy stance of central banks can be transmitted through the entire intermediation 
chain, eventually affecting investors in the marketplace.
1
  
Most obviously, the interbank market is crucially affected by monetary policy decisions. 
These are reflected in LIBOR fluctuations that influence the flow of funds among major 
intermediaries and determine the value of their proprietary portfolio of assets and agreements 
as well as the borrowing ability of dealers. As a result, these intermediaries may have to 
rebalance their own portfolios and modify their risk exposure and degree of leverage to meet 
                                                          
1
 Adrian and Shin (2010a) provide a detailed description of the long intermediation chain characterizing a 
modern financial system and the transmission of liquidity shocks across its links. See also Garcia (1989) for an 
account of the monetary policy tools for liquidity provision to financial intermediaries. 
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regulatory requirements and remain solvent (see e.g. Adrian and Shin, 2010b). At the same 
time, intermediaries pass on to their institutional or individual clients these new terms of 
funds’ exchange by modifying their lending standards as well as their margin requirements or 
call rates. This, in turn, may cause major shifts in the composition of these clients’ portfolios 
and the trading conditions for the corresponding financial assets.
2
 In sum, a shift in the 
quantity of available funds and the price of liquidity at the macro-level can be spread along 
the intermediation chain, reaching investors and traders by altering their funding conditions 
and investment decisions.   
Micro-liquidity mainly refers to these trading conditions, namely the cost, speed, volume 
and price impact of transforming cash into financial assets and vice versa (Chordia et al., 
2005). It is now well understood that micro-liquidity is an important source of market 
frictions and it can have first-order effects on asset prices (see Amihud and Mendelson, 1980, 
1986a, 1986b). Most importantly, micro-liquidity can be regarded as a risk factor leading to 
substantial risk premia in the cross-section of stock returns (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; 
Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). Motivated by this evidence, we argue that macro-liquidity 
shocks, to the extent that they affect liquidity conditions in the stock market, may also have a 
differential impact on the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolios’ returns. Stocks with 
different microstructure characteristics, and hence different exposure to micro-liquidity risk, 
may be differently affected by a common macro-liquidity shock.  
A number of recent studies for the US find that expansionary macro-liquidity shocks 
improve micro-liquidity conditions, especially during periods of financial distress (see e.g. 
Chordia et al., 2005, Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009, Jensen and Moorman, 2010).
3
 Nyborg and 
Ostberg (2010) analyse the process through which banks attempt to recover liquidity when 
                                                          
2
 See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) for a model of the interaction between the availability of funds for 
traders and microstructure liquidity. Fortune (2000) explains the mechanics of margin lending and demonstrates 
the close relationship between the broker call money rate and the Fed Funds rate. 
3
 See also Fernandez-Amador et al. (2013) for evidence suggesting that expansionary monetary policy by the 
European Central Bank increases stock market liquidity in three Eurozone markets (France, Germany and Italy). 
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they face tighter funding conditions. In line with “liquidity pull-back” trading, they find that 
increased tightening in the interbank market is associated with greater trading activity in 
highly liquid stocks relative to less liquid ones.
4
  Our study is also related to the well-
established strand of the literature that examines the impact of monetary policy shocks on 
stock returns (see e.g. Thorbecke, 1997, and Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005).
5
 
The aim of this study is to examine empirically the relationship between macro- and 
micro-liquidity conditions in the UK and to account for the potential impact of the recent 
global financial crisis. We follow Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and adopt an event study 
methodology along with interest futures’ based measures of macro-liquidity shocks in order 
to assess the impact of macro-liquidity on the returns of stock portfolios that have been 
formed on the basis of micro-liquidity measures.
6
 UK macro-liquidity shocks are extracted on 
the meeting days of the Bank of England’s (BoE) Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) 
relative to market expectations embedded in 3-month LIBOR futures prices.  
By examining the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolios, rather than broad stock 
market or sectoral indices, our approach can shed more light on the link between macro- and 
micro-liquidity. Specifically, we utilise the universe of stocks listed on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) during the period 1999-2012 and construct portfolios by sorting them 
according to their Return-to-Volume price impact ratio. This is the most commonly used 
liquidity measure, originally suggested by Amihud (2002). To account for the cross-sectional 
                                                          
4
 Nyborg and Ostberg’s (2010) empirical approach is based upon identifying the highest and lowest funding 
illiquidity days in every month of their sample (based upon the LIBOR-OIS spread and the TED spread) and 
examining the patterns in the corresponding trading activity in more liquid versus less liquid stocks.  
5
 These studies use various empirical approaches, ranging from vector autoregressive models to event studies, 
and find that US stocks react positively to expansionary monetary policy shocks, with a stronger reaction 
identified for small and value stocks (see e.g. Kontonikas and Kostakis, 2013, Maio, 2013). Wongswan (2009) 
and Hausman and Wongswan (2011) investigate the impact of US monetary policy on international stock 
markets. Previous studies on the relationship between monetary policy and stock returns in the UK include 
Bredin et al. (2007) and Gregoriou et al. (2009). 
6
 Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) use the methodology suggested by Kuttner (2001) to extract a measure of interest 
rate shocks from futures contracts written on the Fed funds rate. This approach has become quite popular in the 
literature because these futures contracts naturally embed market participants’ interest rates expectations; thus, 
one-day changes in their prices cleanly isolate the unexpected rate changes.  
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size bias induced by this measure, we also utilize the recently introduced Return-to-Turnover 
Rate price impact ratio (Florackis et al., 2011), which is free of size bias.
7
 
Thus, we contribute to the existing literature by: (i) estimating the response of UK 
liquidity-sorted stock portfolios’ returns to macro-liquidity shocks extracted on the BoE MPC 
meeting days; (ii) accounting for the effect of the 2007-2009 financial crisis; (iii) testing 
whether this return response differs across the portfolios containing the most and the least 
liquid stocks; (iv) examining whether such a potentially different response can be attributed 
to changes in stocks’ trading activity or trading cost conditions induced by these macro-
liquidity shocks; and (v) utilising also a micro-liquidity measure that is immune to size bias. 
Previewing our empirical results, we highlight the following main findings. First, the 
relationship between macro-liquidity shocks and liquidity-sorted portfolio returns is subject 
to an important structural break during the recent financial crisis; failing to account for this 
break, one would erroneously conclude that macro-liquidity shocks have no effect on returns. 
Interest rate cuts during the crisis not only failed to boost stock prices at MPC meeting days, 
but they actually led liquid stocks to lower prices because these were perceived by stock 
market participants as bad news, signals by the BoE of a worsening economic outlook. 
Second, and related to the previous point, interest rate cuts during the crisis reinforced “flight 
to safety” trading away from declining stocks and towards government bonds. Third, our 
results indicate that macro-liquidity shocks are transmitted to the cross-section of liquidity-
sorted portfolios albeit in a differential manner between the most liquid and the most illiquid 
portfolios. Interestingly, the effect is much more statistically and economically significant for 
the most liquid portfolios. Fourth, there is a significant increase in shares’ trading activity and 
a rather small increase in their trading cost on MPC meeting days. The increase in trading 
                                                          
7
 Despite the considerable attention that micro-liquidity has attracted in prior literature, it remains an elusive 
concept (Amihud, 2002, Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003). This feature has led to the emergence of a vast literature 
proposing a series of measures capturing the four dimensions of liquidity (trading cost, quantity, speed and price 
impact). 
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activity is more pronounced for the most illiquid shares, while there is no significant cross-
sectional difference in the trading cost effect.  
Our study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the datasets and discusses various 
methodological issues. Section 3 examines the impact of macro-liquidity shocks on liquidity-
sorted stock portfolios, while Section 4 assesses stock market liquidity conditions, on MPC 
meeting days. Section 5 contains a series of robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
In line with the methodology suggested by Kuttner (2001), we use data from interest rate 
futures to extract macro-liquidity shocks on BoE’s MPC meeting days.8 For the UK, 
however, there are no futures market instruments that track the BoE’s policy rate (the 2-week 
repo rate). The closest substitute is the short sterling futures contract that settles on the 3-
month British Bankers’ Association (BBA) London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR).9 This is 
one of the instruments used by BoE to gauge market expectations regarding future interest 
rates and is widely used to hedge against and speculate on interest rate movements (Brooke et 
al., 2000, Bredin et al., 2007, Joyce et al. 2008). Since this futures contract is written on the 
LIBOR, we argue that the changes of their prices on MPC meetings days can be more 
broadly considered as macro-liquidity shocks initiated by the central bank actions (or 
inactions) rather than being narrowly defined as monetary policy shocks. This is especially 
true because the LIBOR is not necessarily equal to the BoE’s policy rate; their spread, 
equivalent to the LIBOR-OIS spread in the US, is actually time-varying and conveys 
significant information for the interbank market conditions in periods of liquidity draughts 
(Gorton and Metrick, 2010, 2012). 
                                                          
8
 The list of meetings and decisions is available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy. 
9
 The settlement price is 100 minus the BBA LIBOR that prevails at 11:00 on the last trading day (third 
Wednesday of the delivery month) rounded to three decimal places. Contracts are standardised and traded 
between members of the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE). 
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The unanticipated interest rate change (macro-liquidity shock), u
di , is defined as the 
change in the implied 3-month LIBOR rate on the MPC meeting day, d, relative to the 
previous day, d-1, i.e.: 
 , , 1
u
d m d m di f f                               (1)    
where  is the implied interest rate, 100 minus the LIFFE futures contract price, extracted 
by the corresponding contract with delivery month m nearest to the MPC meeting day d.
10
 
The sample period under investigation is June 1999-December 2012, yielding a total of 164 
MPC meetings, and the source of LIBOR futures prices is Thomson DataStream.
11
 Moreover, 
we define the anticipated change in interest rate, , as the actual change in the 3-month 
rate minus the unanticipated change: 
e u
d d di i i                                                   (2) 
Descriptive statistics for the unexpected and expected LIBOR changes on MPC meeting 
days are provided in Panel A of Table 1, along with the corresponding statistics for the 5-year 
and 10-year UK Government bond yield changes, which are also sourced from Thomson 
DataStream. The average unexpected interest rate change is close to zero (-0.001%), ranging 
from a minimum of -0.39% to a maximum of 0.23%. Figure 1 plots the actual along with the 
unexpected change in LIBOR on MPC meeting days. It indicates significant interest rate 
volatility during the financial crisis, especially following the Lehman Brothers’ collapse in 
September 2008.  
                                                          
10
 No adjustment is necessary for the number of days remaining in the month as in the US studies, because 
unlike the futures on the Fed funds rate whose settlement is based on the average Fed funds rate of the last 
month in the futures’ life, in the UK the settlement of the 3-month LIBOR futures is based on the corresponding 
LIBOR of the last trading day. 
11
 We start our event study analysis from June 1999 because LIBOR futures contracts did not settle on a 
monthly basis before that date; only contracts with quarterly delivery existed. The lack of correspondence in 
frequencies between the event (MPC monthly meetings) and the instrument’s settlement may lead to biased 
estimates of the shock before June 1999. 
,m df
e
di
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[Table 1 about here] 
[Figure 1 about here] 
For the construction of liquidity-sorted portfolios, we consider an initial sample that 
consists of all common stocks listed on the LSE for the period from May 1999 to December 
2012. Our analysis covers both presently listed shares and shares that were de-listed at some 
point during the sample period, and hence our dataset is free of any potential survivorship 
bias. We minimize the impact of outliers by excluding firms with a market value less than £5 
million. Finally, following conventional practice in UK stock market studies (see e.g. 
Fletcher and Kihanda, 2005), we exclude unit trusts, investment trusts and ADRs. We obtain 
data from Thomson DataStream and construct, on a daily basis for each stock, a series of 
micro-liquidity measures, namely bid-ask spread, turnover rate, trading volume, Return-to-
Volume and Return-to-Turnover Rate price impact ratios, which capture different dimensions 
of liquidity (i.e. trading cost, trading quantity, trading speed and price-impact). We define 
bid-ask spread as the difference between the ask price quoted (PA) and the bid price offered 
(PB) at the close of the market. Turnover Rate is the ratio of number of shares traded on a day 
to the number of outstanding shares. Trading Volume is measured as the total value (in 
pounds) of all shares traded on a particular day. Return-to-Volume (RtoV) represents the price 
impact ratio for each share and it is calculated as the average ratio of the absolute daily return 
to the corresponding pound trading volume, using 60 trading days prior to the MPC meeting 
day d in month m. To eliminate the impact of very thinly traded stocks, we require a non-zero 
trading volume for at least 45 out of the 60 trading days. Formally, this price impact ratio is 
given by: 
                                                     
1
1 i
D
id
i
di id
R
RtoV
D V
                                                  (3)                                                   
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where Rid  and Vid  are, respectively, the return and monetary trading volume of stock i on day 
d and Di is the number of non-zero trading days for stock i. Finally, the Return-to-Turnover 
Rate (RtoTR) is an alternative price impact ratio recently proposed by Florackis et al. (2011) 
and it is calculated as the average ratio of the absolute daily return to the corresponding 
turnover rate, again using 60 trading days prior to the MPC meeting. This price impact ratio 
is given by: 
                                                                 
1
1 i
D
id
i
di id
R
RtoTR
D TR
                        (4)  
where TRid is the Turnover Rate of stock i at day d, while Di and Rid are as previously 
defined. 
The use of RtoTR is motivated by the potential cross-sectional size bias that Amihud’s 
RtoV ratio encompasses. In particular, since the trading volume that appears in the 
denominator of this ratio is highly correlated with stocks’ market value, ranking stocks 
according to RtoV is almost identical to ranking them according to their capitalization (see 
Florackis et al., 2011, for a more detailed analysis). On the other hand, RtoTR is not expected 
to exhibit a size pattern, because turnover rates are not strongly correlated with market 
values. 
Our final dataset comprises of an average of 780 shares in each month. Using 
alternatively RtoV and RtoTR, we sort listed firms on the trading day prior to each MPC 
meeting day d in month m and we construct quintile portfolios (P1 to P5). In this way, we 
utilize the latest available information regarding shares’ liquidity characteristics and at the 
same time we ensure that these were also available to investors in real time. Portfolio 1 (P1) 
contains the most liquid shares while Portfolio 5 (P5) contains the most illiquid shares. Since 
we are interested in the portfolios’ return response due to a macro-liquidity shock on the 
MPC meeting days, we calculate (daily) portfolio returns on each MPC meeting day. Our 
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benchmark results use equally-weighted portfolio returns, but for robustness we also calculate 
value-weighted returns. Panels B and C of Table 1 provide descriptive statistics for the daily 
returns of portfolios sorted on the basis of RtoV and RtoTR, respectively.  
In our study we also examine the impact of macro-liquidity shocks on stock market 
liquidity conditions. To this end, we investigate whether trading activity, as measured by 
trading volume and turnover rate, and trading cost, as measured by bid-ask spread, for the 
shares in each of the previously described liquidity-sorted portfolios are affected on the MPC 
meeting day. To isolate the effect of the macro-liquidity shock on the MPC meeting day, we 
follow Nyborg and Ostberg (2010) by normalizing each share’s trading activity or cost 
measure extracted on that day with its corresponding average value in the 5 prior trading 
days. For example, the normalized trading volume for share i on MPC meeting day d is given 
by the following expression: 
   
 
,
, 1
,
Volume
Normalized Volume =
Volume /
i d
i d d
i j
j d k
k

 

    (5) 
where k=5 in our benchmark results. Equipped with these normalized measures, we calculate 
the average portfolio normalized trading volume, turnover rate and bid-ask spread for each 
liquidity-sorted portfolio and each MPC meeting day in our sample.   
 
3. Response of stock returns to macro-liquidity shocks 
The starting point of our analysis is to examine the relationship between expected and 
unexpected interest rate changes and the returns of liquidity-sorted portfolios on BoE’s MPC 
meetings. The benchmark model employed by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) is given by: 
              ,
u u e e
p d d d dr i i                   (6) 
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where  is the daily return of the RtoV- or RtoTR-sorted portfolio p on the MPC meeting 
day d. 
Using this benchmark specification, we find in unreported results that neither anticipated 
nor unanticipated interest rate changes have a significant impact on liquidity-sorted portfolio 
returns on MPC meeting days. Moreover, the explanatory power of these regressions is 
almost negligible. These results for the full sample period June 1999- December 2012 are in 
sharp contrast to the evidence documented in prior studies on the inverse returns-shocks 
relationship (see e.g. Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005 for the US and Bredin et al., 2007 for the 
UK market). An inspection of portfolio returns during the crisis period and the preliminary 
evidence provided by Gregoriou et al. (2009) for the UK market motivates us to examine 
whether structural instability lies behind this puzzling finding. 
In particular, the common perception and finding of previous studies that share prices 
rise due to a larger than expected decrease in interest rates was not confirmed during the 
recent financial crisis period. As a characteristic example, while the unexpected interest rate 
decrease on the MPC meeting of 6
th
 November 2008 was an astonishing 0.4%, relative to 
market expectations implied by the 3-month LIBOR futures price, the FTSE All Share index 
plummeted by 5.53% on that day.
12
 Similarly, the most liquid portfolio (P1) constructed on 
the basis of RtoV (RtoTR) yielded a negative return of -4.90% (-3.97%) on the same day. 
Moreover, the unexpected interest rate decrease of 0.1% on the meeting of 8
th
 October 2008 
was associated with a FTSE All Share drop of 4.98%, while the corresponding return for the 
most liquid portfolio on the basis of RtoV (RtoTR) was -3.97% (-3.14%). This puzzling 
phenomenon has attracted considerable attention in the financial press; a plausible 
interpretation is that surprising the market during the crisis by reducing rates more than 
                                                          
12
 It is worth noting that the magnitude of this unanticipated decrease is so big because the market was actually 
expecting an increase in LIBOR on that meeting day. Moreover, the BoE cut its policy rate by a historical record 
of 1.5%. Hence, it is an even more intriguing fact that the stock market collapsed in the face of the largest 
unexpected interest rate cut in record. 
,p dr
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expected was perceived as a signal for an even bleaker economic outlook by the central bank. 
Furthermore, conventional monetary policy becomes ineffective close to the zero lower 
bound and the reduction of interest rates to historically low levels may have been seen as a 
sign of the desperation of the central banks.
13
. Hence, interest rate cuts at the peak of the 
financial crisis instead of boosting stock returns, as previously thought, actually signalled bad 
news to the investment community and led stock prices to lower levels. On the other hand, 
rising interest rates could have been regarded as good news, indicating the end of the crisis 
period.
14
 
In order to formally test for structural change in the relationship between liquidity-sorted 
portfolio returns and macro-liquidity shocks during the financial crisis, we introduce a crisis 
period dummy variable that spans late 2007 to early 2009.
15
 Specifically, the start of the 
financial crisis is dated to August 2007 when major doubts about global financial stability 
emerged and the first major central bank interventions in response to increasing interbank 
market pressures took place, shortly followed by the bank run at Northern Rock in September 
2008. The end of the most intense period of the crisis is dated to early March 2009 when the 
stock market reached its lowest level and subsequently started to recover. The 2007 - 2009 
dating scheme is also consistent with previous analyses of the recent financial crisis (see e.g. 
Brunnermeier, 2009, and Kontonikas et al., 2013). The crisis dummy variable is interacted 
with the explanatory variables of the benchmark specification in (6), leading to the following 
regression model: 
, 1 2 1 2(1 ) (1 )
u Crisis u u Crisis u e Crisis e e Crisis e
p d d d d d d d d d dr D i D i D i D i                    (7)   
                                                          
13
 Buttonwood also utilizes this line of argumentation in “Another paradox of thrift”, The Economist, 18th 
September 2010. 
14
 See, for example, “Why rising rates is good news”, Financial Times, 14th December 2010. 
15
 For robustness, in Section 5.1 we alternatively use a narrower definition of the financial crisis period.   
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where DCrisis  stands for the crisis period dummy variable that takes the value 1 from 
August 2007 to March 2009 and 0 otherwise. 
For estimation, we first use ordinary least squares where t-values are calculated using 
Newey-West (1987) standard errors. For robustness purposes, and in order to account for 
outliers, we also follow Basistha and Kurov (2008), Kurov (2010) and Kontonikas et al. 
(2013), employing the MM weighted least squares procedure introduced by Yohai (1987), 
which yields estimates that are robust to the presence of outliers. Table 2 (Table 3) reports the 
least squares (robust) estimates for RtoV- and RtoTR-sorted equally-weighted portfolio 
returns in Panels A and B, respectively. We also report least square estimates from model (7) 
using value-weighted, instead of equally-weighted, portfolio returns (see Table 4).  
[Tables 2, 3 and 4 about here] 
The results reported in these three Tables lead to the following set of conclusions. 
Starting with the results covering the period outside the financial crisis, we recover the 
inverse relationship between interest rate shocks and stock returns. This inverse relationship 
is both economically and statistically significant, especially for the portfolios containing the 
most liquid stocks. To illustrate the economic significance of the relationship, the estimated  
1
u  coefficients in Table 3 (robust estimates) indicate that, outside the crisis period, an 
unexpected interest rate decrease of 25 basis points would be associated with a positive daily 
return of 1.66% (1.17%) for the most liquid quintile portfolio (P1) constructed on the basis of 
RtoV (RtoTR) price impact ratio. On the other hand, the economic and statistical significance 
of this inverse relationship is much lower for the least liquid portfolio (P5), especially when 
RtoV is used as a sorting criterion. This finding highlights that at MPC meeting days macro-
liquidity shocks are transmitted in a differential manner to stocks with different micro-
liquidity characteristics.  
13 
 
To further examine the link between the performance of liquidity-sorted stock portfolios 
and macro-liquidity shocks, we formally test whether the most liquid - least liquid differential 
response is also statistically significant. This is true when least squares estimates are used 
(see Table 2). Under robust estimates (Table 3), the differential is also statistically significant 
when RtoV is used as a sorting criterion, but not when RtoTR is employed instead. A 
potential interpretation for the differential response is that an expansive macro-liquidity 
shock led to improved stock market liquidity conditions, rendering the liquid stocks even 
closer substitutes to other highly liquid instruments, and hence the corresponding liquidity 
premium required by investors to withhold them was reduced, boosting their prices. The 
opposite process would take place in a contractionary macro-liquidity shock. On the other 
hand, the micro-liquidity conditions of the most illiquid shares were largely unaffected by 
either expansionary or contractionary shocks, rendering their prices unresponsive. We 
formally test this explanation in Section 4. An alternative explanation for this differential 
response is that investors revise the premia they require relative to other highly liquid asset 
classes (e.g. government bonds and commercial paper) only for the most liquid shares; this 
process does not involve the most illiquid shares because their liquidity characteristics 
classify them as a separate asset class. 
The second conclusion we derive from the results presented in Tables 2 to 4 is that both 
expected and unexpected interest rate changes can help explain the daily returns of the 
liquidity-sorted portfolios on BoE MPC meetings once we adjust for the crisis effect. Though 
daily returns are quite noisy by nature, macro-liquidity shocks exhibit a very high explanatory 
power. The adjusted R
2
 of the model can be even higher than 20% for the most liquid 
portfolios and for both liquidity proxies used to construct them when we use robust 
regressions (see Table 3). On the other hand, the explanatory power of the model for the 
portfolios containing the least liquid shares is rather low, showing again that these shares’ 
14 
 
returns are rather unresponsive to the shocks. Overall, these findings highlight the 
fundamental importance of macro-liquidity, confirming that such shocks are directly 
transmitted to share prices via the channels we described in the Introduction, albeit in a 
differential manner between liquid and illiquid shares. Finally, the economic and statistical 
significance of the expected interest rate change coefficients, which was also reported in the 
seminal study of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) for the US market, contradicts the conjecture 
that this information would have been already incorporated into stock prices. 
In terms of the results during the crisis period, we emphatically document that the 
interest rate changes - returns relationship reversed its sign during that period. In particularly, 
2
u  and 2
e  estimates indicate that it turned into a positive relationship that is statistically as 
well as economically highly significant, for both unexpected expected and expected rate 
changes, respectively. In other words, an unexpected (or expected) decrease in the 3-month 
LIBOR led to a negative portfolio return response during the crisis, while it would have 
yielded a positive return outside the crisis period. The magnitude of the return responses is 
also noteworthy; for the portfolios containing liquid shares, the positive response to the shock 
during the crisis was at least twice greater than the negative response (in absolute value) 
documented excluding the crisis. On the other hand, the corresponding response for the 
portfolio P5 containing the least liquid shares was much lower, but still positive during the 
crisis period. In fact, the differential response between the most and the least liquid portfolio 
(P1-P5) during the crisis period was economically and statistically significant for both 
liquidity proxies, for both econometric methodologies and for both equally- and value-
weighted returns, as shown in Tables 2 to 4. 
A possible explanation for the reversal of the shocks-returns relationship during the crisis 
period is that a decrease in interest rates on BoE MPC meeting days was signalling worsening 
prospects for the financial system and the macroeconomy; hence investors fled the stock 
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market liquidating their positions to hoard cash or cash-like instruments, reduce their risk 
exposure and meet margin calls. The “flight to safety” or “flight to liquidity” mechanism, 
according to which investors rebalance their portfolios towards less risky and more liquid 
assets during times of economic and financial distress, is well-studied in the previous 
literature (see e.g. Longstaff, 2004, Chordia et al., 2005, Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009). Indeed, 
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, risk aversion peaked and 
equities experienced major losses while the price of “safe haven” assets increased.16 To 
formally test whether interest rate shocks during the financial crisis reinforced “flight to 
safety” trading, we regress the daily changes in the 5-year and 10-year UK government bond 
yield on MPC meetings (Δyield) on the expected and unexpected interest rate changes: 
1 2 1 2(1 ) (1 )
u Crisis u u Crisis u e Crisis e e Crisis e
d d d d d d d d d dyield D i D i D i D i                     (8)   
The corresponding regression results that are reported in Table 5 validate this argument. 
While the effect of unexpected rate changes on the 5-year UK government bond yield is 
small and statistically insignificant outside the crisis, there is a positive relationship that is 
highly economically and statistically significant during the crisis. In other words, an 
unexpected interest cut during the crisis period was accompanied by a fall in the 5-year UK 
government bond yield, caused by investors fleeing the stock market and investing in 
government bonds, which were considered a “safe haven” at the time. Similar is the evidence 
from the 10-year UK government bond yield.  
[Table 5 about here] 
Finally, the significantly differential return response between the portfolios containing 
the most and the least liquid shares that we previously documented during the crisis period is 
also consistent with “flight to safety” trading. The rebalancing of investors’ portfolios during 
                                                          
16
 For example, while the FTSE 100 stock index declined by 50% between August 2007 and March 2009, the      
5-year UK government yield fell from 5.25% to 2.41% over the same period. 
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the crisis period was mainly accomplished by selling off their most liquid shareholdings, 
because these were easier to liquidate relative to the least liquid shares (consistent with the 
conjecture of Brunnermeier, 2009, and the evidence provided by Anand et al., 2010) and at 
the same time they ceased to be regarded as close substitutes to cash-like instruments such as 
fixed income securities. Therefore, the required premia for the most liquid shares were 
increased, and hence their prices were much more heavily penalized relative to the least 
liquid shares that were already penalized with a high premium required by investors to hold 
them. 
4. Effects on stock market liquidity 
The results in the previous section indicate that the macro-liquidity shocks on MPC 
meetings days are transmitted to the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolio returns in a 
differential way. In this section we examine how these shocks affect the trading activity and 
trading costs of these portfolios, testing also whether there is a differential effect between 
liquid versus illiquid shares. 
4.1  Trading activity 
In this section we examine the trading activity of RtoV- and RtoTR-sorted portfolios on 
MPC meeting days. We proxy trading activity using shares’ trading volume and, 
alternatively, turnover rate. To isolate the effect of the macro-liquidity shock on the MPC 
meeting day only, we follow Nyborg and Ostberg (2010) by normalizing each share’s trading 
volume and turnover rate extracted on that day with its corresponding average value in the 5 
prior trading days, as in equation (5). This normalization adjusts for the different levels of 
trading activity that each share exhibits prior to the MPC meeting and may be irrelevant to 
the effect of the specific macro-liquidity shock. In this way, we can also compare the relative 
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effect on trading activity between liquid and illiquid shares, as classified on the basis of the 
two price impact ratios we utilize in this study. Values of the normalized measure above 
(below) 1 indicate that the trading activity on the MPC meeting day was higher (lower) than 
the prior average trading activity. We have also examined alternative short windows for the 
normalization; the results, which are readily available upon request, are qualitatively similar 
to the ones presented here. 
Table 6 presents the average normalized trading volumes for RtoV-sorted (Panel A) and 
RtoTR-sorted (Panel B) portfolios, while Table 7 presents the corresponding average 
normalized turnover rates. In addition to reporting these averages for all MPC meetings in 
our sample period, we separately report them for meetings with a negative  0ui  , positive 
 0ui   or no  0ui  unexpected interest rate change occurred. In this way, we can also 
examine whether the direction of the interest rate shock on the MPC meeting day affects 
shares’ trading activity. Finally, we also report the corresponding averages excluding the 
meetings that took place during the financial crisis period, i.e. from August 2007 to March 
2009, to examine whether there was any particular crisis effect. 
[Tables 6 and 7 about here] 
The results reported in Tables 6 and 7 lead to the following conclusions. First, trading 
activity considerably increases on MPC meeting days for the entire cross-section of liquidity-
sorted portfolios. This is true for both proxies of trading activity. In particular, the reported 
values show that, in almost every case we examined, there is an increase of at least 15% 
relative to the average trading activity observed in the 5 prior trading days. Unreported t-tests 
show that this increase is also statistically significant at the 1% level or lower. Second, the 
observed increase in the trading activity remains remarkably robust across the different 
categories of MPC meetings. It does not depend on the sign of the interest rate shock and it 
cannot be attributed to the crisis period. This finding highlights that the MPC meeting is an 
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important date for investors’ calendar and that the informational content of MPC decisions is 
very important, leading to a significant increase in trading activity on this day. Third, the 
normalized trading activity of the least liquid shares, as classified by their price impact ratios 
prior to the meeting, increases much more relative to the trading activity of the most liquid 
shares. The differential trading activity normalized increase between the most and the least 
liquid portfolios (P1-P5) can be even higher than 20% and it is highly significant. This 
finding highlights that investors trade the least liquid shares on MPC meetings much more 
actively relative to the prior days. Therefore, the finding of the previous section that the 
returns response of the least liquid shares to macro-liquidity shocks is rather mundane cannot 
be attributed to thin trading of these stocks; quite the opposite is true on MPC meetings. 
Thus, it appears that higher trading in least liquid shares on MPC meeting days does not 
exhibit an overall direction that is as consistent as in the case of most liquid shares, and 
therefore does not lead to strongly positive or negative returns.  Concluding, the differential 
response between the most and the least liquid shares’ returns to the common macro-liquidity 
shocks that we documented in Tables 2 to 4 is not due to a differential impact on their micro-
liquidity conditions.       
4.2  Trading cost 
In Table 8 we report the average normalized bid-ask spread for RtoV-sorted (Panel A) 
and RtoTR-sorted (Panel B) portfolios on MPC meeting days. The normalization is 
performed using each share’s average bid-ask spread in the 5 trading days prior to the 
meeting. As with trading activity, we report the average bid-ask spreads for all meetings 
taking place in our sample period, for different signs of the interest rate shocks as well as 
excluding the meetings that took place during the crisis period.      
[Table 8 about here] 
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The results reported in Table 8 lead to the following conclusions. First, there is a small 
increase in shares’ bid-ask spreads on MPC meetings relative to the prior trading days. This 
increase is in the order of 5% and it is observed across all liquidity-sorted portfolios. Second, 
this small increase in the normalized bid-ask spreads remains intact when we separately 
examine MPC meetings associated with a positive, negative or no unanticipated interest rate 
change. This is an interesting and counterintuitive finding since, for example, trading costs 
are not reduced even when expansive macro-liquidity shocks (i.e. unexpected interest rate 
cuts) occur. Possibly, this result shows that bid-ask spreads widen relatively to the prior days 
because of the arrival of new information related to MPC decisions and the corresponding 
price discovery process that accompanies the considerably increased trading activity we 
previously documented. Third, this relative increase in the bid-ask spreads is similar across 
the liquidity-sorted portfolios. The differential relative increase between the most liquid and 
the most illiquid portfolios (P1-P5) is neither economically nor statistically significantly 
different from zero. 
5.   Robustness checks 
5.1 Alternative definition of the crisis period 
 The introduction of the slope dummy variable for the recent crisis period in model (6) has 
played a crucial role for our analysis. As a result, it is legitimate to ask how an alternative 
definition of the crisis period may affect the reported results. For robustness purposes, we use 
September 2008, when Lehman Brothers collapsed, as an alternative starting point of the 
crisis. Thus, the slope dummy variable  now takes the value of 1 during the period 
September 2008 - March 2009 and 0 otherwise. Using the resulting narrower crisis period 
definition that essentially captures the most intense phase of the recent financial crisis, we re-
estimate model (7).  
DCrisis
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The estimation results, shown on Table 9, are very similar to the ones obtained using the 
benchmark definition of the crisis period. The inverse shocks-returns relationship excluding 
the crisis is economically and statistically significant. Most importantly, we also confirm the 
reversal in the sign of this relationship during the crisis period. The economic as well as the 
statistical significance of the positive response of returns to interest rate shocks remains intact 
and robust to the narrower definition of the crisis period. Examining the return responses 
across liquidity-sorted portfolio, our findings are very robust to the alternative 
characterization of the crisis period. In particular, the most liquid portfolios’ returns react 
more negatively than the most illiquid portfolios’ returns to interest rate shocks before and 
after the crisis period. Moreover, during the crisis period, the most liquid portfolios’ returns 
react far more positively to these shocks relative to the most illiquid portfolios’ returns. 
[Table 9 about here] 
5.2  Additional control variables 
Our analysis has focused on the response of liquidity-sorted daily portfolios’ returns to 
macro-liquidity shocks. Despite the use of an event study methodology, arguably other 
factors may be driving our results. To take into account potentially omitted variables that may 
affect UK daily stock returns, we estimate the following augmented regression model: 
, 1 2 1 2(1 ) (1 ) '
u Crisis u u Crisis u e Crisis e e Crisis e
p d d d d d d d d d d dr D i D i D i D i X                        (9) 
where  represents the vector of additional explanatory variables. Following Bredin et al. 
(2007), we consider as additional control variables the daily change in the log sterling pound/ 
US dollar exchange rate, the daily change in the log sterling pound/ Euro exchange rate as 
dX
21 
 
well as the return on the US market as proxied by the daily change in the log S&P 500 
index.
17
 
Table 10 contains the response coefficients estimated from model (9). Panel A presents 
the results for the RtoV-sorted portfolios’ returns, while Panel B shows the corresponding 
results for the RtoTR-sorted portfolios’ returns. We can confirm the robustness of our 
benchmark results, even in the presence of additional explanatory variables. There is a 
differential response to interest rate shocks between the most liquid and the most illiquid 
portfolios’ returns. This differential response is particularly significant, both statistically and 
economically, during the crisis period. More specifically, most liquid portfolios’ returns 
exhibited a highly positive reaction to macro-liquidity shocks during the crisis, while most 
illiquid portfolios’ returns remained largely unaffected. 
[Table 10 about here] 
5.3  Alternative definition of macro-liquidity shocks 
This study has utilized macro-liquidity shocks defined relative to market expectations 
embedded in the traded futures contract written on the 3-month LIBOR. A series of previous 
US-based studies have utilized the changes in the LIBOR-OIS spread as a measure of 
interbank market funding conditions, with increases in the spread indicating macro-liquidity 
deterioration.
18
 Therefore, in this subsection we seek to examine the response of the micro-
liquidity sorted portfolios’ returns to changes in this alternative proxy of macro-liquidity 
conditions. For the UK market, we define the equivalent spread as the difference between the 
3-month LIBOR (L) and the BoE Base rate (B). An increase in the LIBOR-BoE rate spread 
on an MPC meeting day implies an adverse macro-liquidity shock, in the sense that funding 
conditions for financial intermediaries and market participants deteriorate, either through an 
                                                          
17
 Given the time lag between the US and the UK market close, we follow common practice in the literature and 
use the lagged S&P 500 daily return. 
18
 The LIBOR-OIS spread is widely accepted as “a barometer of fears of bank insolvency” in the words of Alan 
Greenspan (see Thornton, 2009, and Gorton and Metrick, 2012, for an analysis of its features).  
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increase in the cost of funds or through a reduction in their supply. The model we estimate is 
given by: 
                       , (  )
spread
p d d dr LIBOR BoE rate                   (10)
 
where (  )dLIBOR BoE rate   stands for the change in the spread on meeting day d over the 
previous trading day d-1. 
An important feature of the LIBOR-BoE rate spread is that it becomes very active mainly 
since the onset of the financial crisis in late 2007 (see Figure 2). As a result, we do not need 
to introduce a crisis period slope dummy variable in model (10). This effect is inherently 
taken into account by the behaviour of the spread. Furthermore, we do not decompose 
between anticipated and unanticipated components of this spread change (see also Nyborg 
and Ostberg, 2010). 
Table 11 presents the estimated response coefficients from model (10). Panel A (Panel 
B) contains the results for the RtoV (RtoTR)-sorted portfolios’ returns. Overall, the results 
show again a significantly different response between the most liquid and the most illiquid 
portfolios’ returns. In particular, we find that the returns of the most liquid portfolios exhibit 
a significantly negative response to innovations in the LIBOR-Base rate spread. Moreover, 
this variable possesses very strong explanatory power with respect to liquid portfolios’ 
returns. Regarding the most illiquid portfolios’ returns, they are significantly less affected by 
innovations in this spread.  
[Table 11 about here] 
6.    Conclusions 
The 2007-2009 global financial meltdown has brought macro- and micro-liquidity to the 
center stage of analysis for asset prices’ fluctuations and the stability of the financial system. 
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This study examines the transmission of shocks that affect the funding liquidity conditions of 
market participants and financial intermediaries to stock market returns. In particular, we 
examine the potential link between macro-liquidity shocks and the returns of portfolios sorted 
on the basis of the shares’ micro-liquidity. In the process of doing so, we also account for the 
impact of the recent financial crisis. Shocks are extracted relative to market expectations 
embedded in LIBOR futures prices on BoE MPC’s meeting days. Furthermore, we evaluate 
the underlying micro-liquidity conditions during those days. 
There are four important conclusions from our empirical analysis. First, the relationship 
between macro-liquidity shocks and liquidity-sorted portfolio returns has changed 
significantly, by reversing its sign, during the recent financial crisis. Specifically, as nominal 
interest rates moved towards the zero lower bound, expansionary rate surprises led to lower 
prices for liquid stocks since investors perceived them as bad news for future economic 
prospects. Second, seen in this light, interest rate cuts during the crisis reinforced a 
rebalancing of portfolios away from stocks and towards “safe haven” assets such as 
government bonds. Third, the impact of macro-liquidity shocks is much more statistically and 
economically significant for the portfolio returns of most liquid stocks. Fourth, on MPC 
meeting days stocks’ trading activity increases significantly, especially for the most illiquid 
shares. Trading cost also increases but not strongly, and without exhibiting significant cross-
sectional differences. 
These empirical findings have several important implications for policy makers and 
market participants. The conventional wisdom that reducing interest rates can boost stock 
prices in the short-run does not necessarily hold during a severe crisis period. To the contrary, 
under such conditions, interest rate cuts may actually send the wrong signal to investors who 
may perceive them as a message that macroeconomic prospects are even worse than 
previously thought. This signalling effect may actually exacerbate the impact of adverse 
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market conditions, eventually leading investors to flee the stock market, initializing a 
downward price spiral and posing a serious threat to the stability of the financial system. 
Moreover, the transmission of these macro-liquidity shocks may affect differentially stocks 
with different micro-liquidity conditions. Therefore, dissecting the cross-section of stock 
returns can prove quite useful for portfolio selection and diversification due to their 
differential exposure to liquidity risk. This differential risk exposure may lead to differential 
premia and less correlated price movements. Concluding, as Blinder (2012) recently noted, 
the reduction of policy rates to levels close to the zero lower bound and the implementation 
of Quantitative Easing by BoE calls for a detailed investigation of the impact of 
unconventional monetary policies on the returns of liquidity-sorted portfolios; this topic is 
left for future research.  
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    Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Interest rate changes  
 Mean Median Max Min St. Dev. 
Expected rate change -0.004% 0% 0.26% -0.40% 0.06% 
Unexpected rate change -0.001% 0% 0.23% -0.39% 0.07% 
5-year bond yield change  -0.007% -0.01% 0.15% -0.18% 0.06% 
10-year bond yield change -0.003% -0.01% 0.17% -0.1% 0.06% 
Panel B: RtoV-sorted portfolios 
Portfolio Mean Median Max Min St. Dev. 
P1 (most liquid) -0.10% -0.03% 5.52% -4.90% 1.32% 
P2 0.01% 0.06% 5.26% -4.23% 1.28% 
P3 0.05% 0.15% 2.64% -4.28% 0.90% 
P4 0.06% 0.16% 2.13% -4.30% 0.80% 
P5 (most illiquid) 0.12% 0.26% 3.51% -4.31% 0.96% 
Panel C: RtoTR-sorted portfolios 
Portfolio Mean Median Max Min St. Dev. 
P1 (most liquid) -0.03% 0.07% 5.35% -4.49% 1.20% 
P2 -0.01% 0.08% 4.51% -4.58% 1.21% 
P3 0.08% 0.17% 3.26% -4.58% 1.02% 
P4 0.06% 0.18% 2.60% -3.74% 0.85% 
P5 (most illiquid) 0.04% 0.09% 2.32% -4.28% 0.87% 
 
Notes: This Table presents descriptive statistics for liquidity-sorted portfolios’ daily returns on Bank of England’s 
(BoE) Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting days. The analysis covers the period from June 1999 to 
December 2012 (164 MPC meetings). Panel A reports statistics for the expected and unexpected 3-month LIBOR 
changes, relative to expectations implied from LIBOR futures prices, as well as for the 5-year and 10-year UK 
government bond yield changes. Panel B reports the statistics for equally-weighted quintile portfolios constructed on 
the basis of LSE-listed shares’ Return-to-Volume (RtoV) price impact ratios calculated over the 60 trading days 
prior to the MPC meeting. Portfolio P1 contains the most liquid shares, while Portfolio P5 contains the most illiquid 
shares. Panel B reports the corresponding statistics for portfolios constructed on the basis of shares’ Return-to-
Turnover Rate (RtoTR) price impact ratios calculated in the same way.  
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Table 2: Response of liquidity-sorted equally-weighted portfolio returns to rate changes- Least 
squares 
 
Panel A: RtoV-sorted portfolios 
Portfolio (1 )u Crisisi D   (1 )e Crisisi D   u Crisisi D  e Crisisi D  
2  adj.R  
P1 (most liquid) -6.47** 
(-2.08) 
-4.91* 
(-1.72) 
19.58*** 
(7.05) 
14.16*** 
(3.07) 
8.82% 
P2 -5.64** 
(-2.10) 
-2.39 
(-0.95) 
15.26*** 
(5.25) 
10.40** 
(2.27) 
6.16% 
P3 -2.39 
(-1.22) 
-0.88 
(-0.45) 
10.94*** 
(5.31) 
6.27* 
(1.94) 
6.55% 
P4 -2.22 
(-1.35) 
-1.14 
(-0.58) 
4.53* 
(1.86) 
0.85 
(0.22) 
2.25% 
P5 (most illiquid) -1.68 
(-0.70) 
-0.33 
(-0.13) 
3.08 
(1.05) 
0.65 
(0.16) 
-0.76% 
P1-P5 spread -4.79** 
(-2.51) 
-4.58*** 
(-3.19) 
16.50*** 
(7.06) 
13.52*** 
(4.77) 
10.35% 
Panel B: RtoTR-sorted portfolios 
P1 (most liquid) -5.26* 
(-1.80) 
-2.31 
(-0.89) 
16.09*** 
(7.31) 
11.65*** 
(3.22) 
7.34% 
P2 -5.34** 
(-2.07) 
-3.18 
(-1.25) 
16.97*** 
(5.63) 
11.77** 
(2.41) 
7.98% 
P3 -2.87 
(-1.44) 
-2.22 
(-1.07) 
12.33*** 
(4.68) 
5.88 
(1.34) 
8.05% 
P4 -2.50 
(-1.26) 
-1.09 
(-0.54) 
7.36*** 
(3.30) 
4.49 
(1.47) 
2.29% 
P5 (most illiquid) -2.43 
(-1.12) 
-0.85 
(-0.33) 
0.64 
(0.25) 
-1.45 
(-0.37) 
-0.57% 
P1-P5 spread -2.83* 
(-1.74) 
-1.46 
(-1.15) 
15.45*** 
(9.09) 
13.10*** 
(7.01) 
13.39% 
 
Notes: This Table presents the estimates from least squares regressions of liquidity-sorted equally-weighted portfolio 
returns (rp,d) on expected (Δi
e
) and unexpected (Δiu) 3-month LIBOR changes on BoE MPC meeting days during the 
period June 1999- December 2012 (164 MPC meetings), according to the model below: 
, 1 2 1 2(1 ) (1 )
u Crisis u u Crisis u e Crisis e e Crisis e
p d d d d d d d d d dr D i D i D i D i                 . 
D
Crisis
 takes the value 1 on MPC meetings from August 2007 to March 2009 and 0 otherwise. Firms listed on LSE are 
classified into quintile portfolios on the basis of their Return-to-Volume (RtoV, Panel A) or Return-to-Turnover Rate 
(RtoTR, Panel B) price impact ratio calculated using 60 trading days prior to the MPC meeting. Portfolio P1 contains the 
most liquid shares, while P5 contains the most illiquid shares. The corresponding estimates for the spread return between 
the most liquid and the most illiquid portfolios (P1-P5) are also reported. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for the estimated coefficients using Newey-West standard errors. 
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Table 3: Response of liquidity-sorted equally-weighted portfolio returns to rate changes- Robust 
estimates 
 
Panel A: RtoV-sorted portfolios 
Portfolio (1 )u Crisisi D   (1 )e Crisisi D   u Crisisi D  e Crisisi D  
2  adj.R  
P1 (most liquid) -6.65*** 
(-2.75) 
-6.85*** 
(-3.06) 
20.88*** 
(5.98) 
16.86*** 
(4.76) 21.18% 
P2 -4.76** 
(-2.15) 
-4.05** 
(-1.97) 
16.40*** 
(5.13) 
12.77*** 
(3.86) 15.86% 
P3 -3.62*** 
(-2.61) 
-3.28** 
(-2.55) 
13.46*** 
(6.85) 
10.45*** 
(5.22) 25.34% 
P4 -3.45*** 
(-2.89) 
-3.11*** 
(-2.80) 
7.82*** 
(4.65) 
6.46*** 
(3.68) 15.09% 
P5 (most illiquid) -3.58** 
(-2.12) 
-2.77* 
(-1.75) 
5.97** 
(2.44) 
5.64** 
(2.30) 3.98% 
P1-P5 spread -4.24*** 
(-2.94) 
-5.60** 
(-2.06) 
17.07*** 
(5.53) 
13.53*** 
(4.39) 18.63% 
Panel B: RtoTR-sorted portfolios 
P1 (most liquid) -4.66** 
(-2.27) 
-4.00** 
(-2.10) 
17.47*** 
(5.99) 
14.29*** 
(4.80) 
19.65% 
P2 -5.02** 
(-2.44) 
-4.80** 
(-2.49) 
18.94*** 
(6.49) 
15.50*** 
(5.18) 
22.79% 
P3 -4.06*** 
(-2.70) 
-4.47*** 
(-3.22) 
14.50*** 
(6.65) 
9.68*** 
(4.37) 
28.33% 
P4 -4.16*** 
(-2.93) 
-3.40*** 
(-2.59) 
9.74*** 
(4.83) 
8.58*** 
(4.19) 
15.12% 
P5 (most illiquid) -4.11*** 
(-2.63) 
-3.57** 
(-2.44) 
3.51 
(1.61) 
3.61 
(1.62) 
3.71% 
P1-P5 spread -1.97 
(-1.18) 
-1.80 
(-1.17) 
16.18*** 
(6.64) 
13.33*** 
(5.45) 
20.98% 
 
Notes: This Table presents the estimates from robust regressions of liquidity-sorted equally-weighted portfolio returns 
(rp,d) on expected (Δi
e) and unexpected (Δiu) 3-month LIBOR changes on BoE MPC meeting days during the period 
June 1999- December 2012 (164 MPC meetings), according to the model below:  
, 1 2 1 2(1 ) (1 )
u Crisis u u Crisis u e Crisis e e Crisis e
p d d d d d d d d d dr D i D i D i D i                 . 
D
Crisis
 takes the value 1 on MPC meetings from August 2007 to March 2009 and 0 otherwise. The MM weighted least 
squares estimation procedure of Yohai (1987), which is robust to the presence of outliers, is employed. Firms listed on 
LSE are classified into quintile portfolios on the basis of their Return-to-Volume (RtoV, Panel A) or Return-to-
Turnover Rate (RtoTR, Panel B) price impact ratio, calculated using 60 trading days prior to the MPC meeting. 
Portfolio P1 contains the most liquid shares, while P5 contains the most illiquid shares. The corresponding estimates for 
the spread return between the most liquid and the most illiquid portfolios (P1-P5) are also reported. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Response of liquidity-sorted value-weighted portfolio returns to rate changes- Robust 
estimates 
 
Panel A: RtoV-sorted portfolios 
Portfolio (1 )
u Crisisi D   (1 )e Crisisi D   u Crisisi D  e Crisisi D  2  adj.R  
P1 (most liquid) -8.19*** 
(-3.51) 
-8.05*** 
(-3.78) 
20.89*** 
(6.03) 
15.27*** 
(4.43) 
24.77% 
P2 -5.39** 
(-2.32) 
-4.78** 
(-2.18) 
15.42*** 
(4.70) 
11.69*** 
(3.46) 
14.39% 
P3 -3.24* 
(-1.91) 
-2.76* 
(-1.72) 
13.01*** 
(5.52) 
9.27*** 
(3.83) 
18.24% 
P4 -4.06*** 
(-2.85) 
-3.31** 
(-2.44) 
6.23*** 
(3.12) 
6.12*** 
(2.94) 
8.17% 
P5 (most illiquid) -3.51** 
(-2.17) 
-2.48* 
(-1.65) 
3.76 
(1.61) 
3.86 
(1.63) 
2.18% 
P1-P5 spread -6.12*** 
(-2.59) 
-7.63*** 
(-3.52) 
19.63*** 
(5.68) 
13.46*** 
(3.92) 
22.68% 
Panel B: RtoTR-sorted portfolios 
P1 (most liquid) -7.43*** 
(-3.26) 
-6.90*** 
(-3.30) 
22.19*** 
(6.45) 
18.40*** 
(5.46) 
24.01% 
P2 -6.31** 
(-2.35) 
-7.02*** 
(-2.84) 
20.21*** 
(5.25) 
13.70*** 
(3.50) 
19.41% 
P3 -6.75** 
(-2.48) 
-8.14*** 
(-3.14) 
7.38* 
(1.81) 
1.02 
(0.24) 
10.32% 
P4 -4.85* 
(-1.85) 
-5.12** 
(-2.12) 
9.90*** 
(2.68) 
6.89* 
(1.87) 
5.31% 
P5 (most illiquid) -1.96 
(-0.64) 
-0.85 
(-0.26) 
11.04*** 
(2.63) 
6.51 
(1.57) 
4.02% 
P1-P5 spread -2.46 
(-0.88) 
-0.79 
(-0.29) 
9.45** 
(2.46) 
7.87** 
(2.03) 
2.11% 
Notes: This Table presents the estimates from robust regressions of liquidity-sorted value-weighted portfolio returns 
(rp,d) on expected (Δi
e) and unexpected (Δiu) 3-month LIBOR changes on BoE MPC meeting days during the period 
June 1999- December 2012 (164 MPC meetings), according to the model below:  
, 1 2 1 2(1 ) (1 )
u Crisis u u Crisis u e Crisis e e Crisis e
p d d d d d d d d d dr D i D i D i D i                 . 
D
Crisis
 takes the value 1 on MPC meetings from August 2007 to March 2009 and 0 otherwise. The MM weighted least 
squares estimation procedure of Yohai (1987), which is robust to the presence of outliers, is employed. Firms listed on 
LSE are classified into quintile portfolios on the basis of their Return-to-Volume (RtoV, Panel A) or Return-to-
Turnover Rate (RtoTR, Panel B) price impact ratio, calculated using 60 trading days prior to the MPC meeting. 
Portfolio P1 contains the most liquid shares, while P5 contains the most illiquid shares. The corresponding estimates for 
the spread return between the most liquid and the most illiquid portfolios (P1-P5) are also reported. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Response of 5-year and 10-year UK bond yield changes to rate changes- Least squares 
 
 (1 )u Crisisi D   (1 )e Crisisi D   u Crisisi D  e Crisisi D  
2  adj.R  
5-year bond yield change  0.13 
(0.84) 
-0.26* 
(-1.87) 
0.59*** 
(3.87) 
0.43** 
(2.05) 
13.93% 
 
10-year bond yield change  
 
-0.03 
(-0.18) 
 
-0.23* 
(-1.71) 
0.55*** 
(2.72) 
0.52* 
(1.83) 
 
4.60% 
 
Notes: This Table presents the estimates from least squares regressions of 5-year and 10-year UK government bond yield 
changes (Δyield) on rate on expected (Δie) and unexpected (Δiu) 3-month LIBOR changes on BoE MPC meeting days 
during the period June 1999- December 2012 (164 MPC meetings), according to the model below: 
1 2 1 2(1 ) (1 )
u Crisis u u Crisis u e Crisis e e Crisis e
d d d d d d d d d dyield D i D i D i D i                  . 
Δyieldd stands for the change in the government bond yield on meeting day d over the previous trading day d-1. D
Crisis
 takes 
the value 1 on MPC meetings from August 2007 to March 2009 and 0 otherwise. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for the estimated coefficients using Newey-West standard errors. 
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Table 6: Average normalized trading volume of liquidity-sorted portfolios on MPC meeting days 
 
                              Panel A: RtoV-sorted portfolios 
 P1 (liquid) P2 P3 P4 P5 (illiquid) P1-P5 
All meetings (N=164) 1.15 1.24 1.35 1.39 1.34 -0.19*** 
Meetings with 
ui <0 (N=74) 1.15 1.25 1.36 1.39 1.33 -0.18*** 
Meetings with 
ui >0 (N=62) 1.16 1.23 1.34 1.40 1.37 -0.21*** 
Meetings with 
ui =0 (N=28) 1.15 1.21 1.34 1.35 1.33 -0.18*** 
Excluding crisis (N=144) 1.15 1.25 1.36 1.40 1.34 -0.19*** 
Excluding crisis and 
ui <0 (N=69) 1.14 1.25 1.37 1.40 1.31 -0.17*** 
Excluding crisis and 
ui >0 (N=48) 1.16 1.26 1.37 1.43 1.38 -0.22*** 
Excluding crisis and 
ui =0 (N=27) 1.15 1.22 1.35 1.35 1.32 -0.18*** 
                               Panel B: RtoTR-sorted portfolios 
All meetings (N=164) 1.19 1.22 1.30 1.39 1.37 -0.18*** 
Meetings with 
ui <0 (N=74) 1.20 1.22 1.29 1.40 1.36 -0.16*** 
Meetings with 
ui >0 (N=62) 1.19 1.22 1.31 1.39 1.39 -0.20*** 
Meetings with 
ui =0 (N=28) 1.17 1.24 1.26 1.32 1.37 -0.20*** 
Excluding crisis (N=144) 1.20 1.23 1.30 1.40 1.37 -0.18*** 
Excluding crisis and 
ui <0 (N=69) 1.20 1.22 1.30 1.40 1.35 -0.15*** 
Excluding crisis and 
ui >0 (N=48) 1.20 1.24 1.33 1.43 1.41 -0.21*** 
Excluding crisis and 
ui =0 (N=27) 1.18 1.25 1.28 1.32 1.37 -0.19*** 
 
Notes: This Table shows the average normalized trading volume of liquidity-sorted portfolios on BoE MPC meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2012. 
The trading volume of each share on MPC meeting day d is normalized using its average trading volume in the 5 prior trading days. The average portfolio normalized 
trading volume is calculated for all MPC meetings in our sample period as well as, separately, for the meetings that a negative (Δiu<0), positive (Δiu>0) or no (Δiu=0) 
unexpected interest rate change occurred relative to expectations embedded in 3-month LIBOR futures prices. The corresponding averages are also calculated excluding 
the meetings that took place during the financial crisis period, i.e. from August 2007 to March 2009. To construct liquidity portfolios, shares listed on LSE are sorted on 
the basis of their Return-to-Volume (RtoV, Panel A) and Return-to-Turnover Rate (RtoTR, Panel B) price impact ratios and are assigned to quintile portfolios. Portfolio P1 
contains the most liquid shares, while P5 contains the most illiquid shares. The difference in the average normalized trading volume between the most liquid and the most 
illiquid portfolios (P1-P5) is also reported and its statistical significance is indicated. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Average normalized turnover rate of liquidity-sorted portfolios on MPC meeting days  
                              Panel A: RtoV-sorted portfolios 
 P1 (liquid) P2 P3 P4 P5 (illiquid) P1-P5 
All meetings (N=164) 1.15 1.22 1.34 1.38 1.33 -0.19*** 
Meetings with 
ui <0 (N=74) 1.14 1.23 1.35 1.38 1.32 -0.17*** 
Meetings with 
ui >0 (N=62) 1.15 1.22 1.34 1.39 1.35 -0.20*** 
Meetings with 
ui =0 (N=28) 1.14 1.20 1.33 1.34 1.32 -0.19*** 
Excluding crisis (N=144) 1.14 1.23 1.36 1.39 1.33 -0.18*** 
Excluding crisis and 
ui <0 (N=69) 1.14 1.23 1.36 1.39 1.30 -0.16*** 
Excluding crisis and 
ui >0 (N=48) 1.15 1.25 1.36 1.42 1.37 -0.21*** 
Excluding crisis and 
ui =0 (N=27) 1.14 1.21 1.34 1.34 1.32 -0.18*** 
                              Panel B: RtoTR-sorted portfolios 
All meetings (N=164) 1.17 1.21 1.29 1.38 1.37 -0.20*** 
Meetings with 
ui <0 (N=74) 1.18 1.21 1.29 1.40 1.36 -0.18*** 
Meetings with 
ui >0 (N=62) 1.17 1.21 1.31 1.39 1.39 -0.22*** 
Meetings with 
ui =0 (N=28) 1.16 1.23 1.26 1.32 1.37 -0.21*** 
Excluding crisis (N=144) 1.17 1.22 1.30 1.39 1.37 -0.20*** 
Excluding crisis and 
ui <0 (N=69) 1.17 1.21 1.29 1.40 1.35 -0.17*** 
Excluding crisis and 
ui >0 (N=48) 1.17 1.23 1.32 1.42 1.41 -0.23*** 
Excluding crisis and 
ui =0 (N=27) 1.16 1.23 1.27 1.32 1.36 -0.20*** 
 
Notes: This Table shows the average normalized turnover rate of liquidity-sorted portfolios on BoE MPC meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2012. 
The turnover rate of each share on MPC meeting day d is normalized using its average turnover rate in the 5 prior trading days. The average portfolio normalized 
turnover rate is calculated for all MPC meetings in our sample period as well as, separately, for the meetings that a negative (Δiu<0), positive (Δiu>0) or no (Δiu=0) 
unexpected interest rate change occurred relative to expectations embedded in 3-month LIBOR futures prices. The corresponding averages are also calculated excluding 
the meetings that took place during the financial crisis period, i.e. from August 2007 to March 2009. To construct liquidity portfolios, shares listed on LSE are sorted on 
the basis of their Return-to-Volume (RtoV, Panel A) and Return-to-Turnover Rate (RtoTR, Panel B) price impact ratios and are assigned to quintile portfolios. Portfolio 
P1 contains the most liquid shares, while P5 contains the most illiquid shares. The difference in the average normalized turnover rate between the most liquid and the 
most illiquid portfolios (P1-P5) is also reported and its statistical significance is indicated. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 8: Average normalized bid-ask spread of liquidity-sorted portfolios on MPC meeting days  
                              Panel A: RtoV-sorted portfolios 
 P1 (liquid) P2 P3 P4 P5 (illiquid) P1-P5 
All meetings (N=164) 1.05 1.07 1.06 1.04 1.04 0.01 
Meetings with 
ui <0 (N=74) 1.05 1.09 1.07 1.04 1.05 0.01 
Meetings with 
ui >0 (N=62) 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.03 0.01 
Meetings with 
ui =0 (N=28) 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.03 0.03 
Excluding crisis (N=144) 1.05 1.07 1.06 1.04 1.04 0.02 
Excluding crisis and 
ui <0 (N=69) 1.06 1.09 1.07 1.04 1.05 0.01 
Excluding crisis and 
ui >0 (N=48) 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.03 1.02 0.02 
Excluding crisis and 
ui =0 (N=27) 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.04 0.03 
                              Panel B: RtoTR-sorted portfolios 
All meetings (N=164) 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.05 0.00 
Meetings with 
ui <0 (N=74) 1.06 1.08 1.06 1.05 1.06 0.00 
Meetings with 
ui >0 (N=62) 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.05 0.00 
Meetings with 
ui =0 (N=28) 1.06 1.07 1.04 1.04 1.04 0.02 
Excluding crisis (N=144) 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.05 0.01 
Excluding crisis and 
ui <0 (N=69) 1.06 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.05 0.01 
Excluding crisis and 
ui >0 (N=48) 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.03 0.01 
Excluding crisis and 
ui =0 (N=27) 1.07 1.07 1.04 1.04 1.05 0.02 
 
Notes: This Table shows the average normalized bid-ask spread of liquidity-sorted portfolios on BoE MPC meeting days during the period June 1999- December 2012. 
The bid-ask spread of each share on MPC meeting day d is normalized using its average bid-ask spread in the 5 prior trading days. The average portfolio normalized 
bid-ask spread is calculated for all MPC meetings in our sample period as well as, separately, for the meetings that a negative (Δiu<0), positive (Δiu>0) or no (Δiu=0) 
unexpected interest rate change occurred relative to expectations embedded in 3-month LIBOR futures prices. The corresponding averages are also calculated 
excluding the meetings that took place during the financial crisis period, i.e. from August 2007 to March 2009. To construct liquidity portfolios, shares listed on LSE 
are sorted on the basis of their Return-to-Volume (RtoV, Panel A) and Return-to-Turnover Rate (RtoTR, Panel B) price impact ratios and are assigned to quintile 
portfolios. Portfolio P1 contains the most liquid shares, while P5 contains the most illiquid shares. The difference in the average normalized bid-ask spread between the 
most liquid and the most illiquid portfolios (P1-P5) is also reported and its statistical significance is indicated. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
36 
 
Table 9: Response of liquidity-sorted equally-weighted portfolio returns to rate changes using a 
narrower crisis period definition 
Panel A: RtoV-sorted portfolios 
Portfolio (1 )u Crisisi D   (1 )e Crisisi D   u Crisisi D  e Crisisi D  
2  adj.R  
P1 (most liquid) -5.55* 
(-1.75) 
-3.86 
(-1.28) 
19.10** 
(2.45) 
13.22** 
(2.45) 
7.77% 
P2 -5.06* 
(-1.87) 
-1.69 
(-0.65) 
14.87*** 
(4.65) 
9.12* 
(1.83) 
6.21% 
P3 -2.31 
(-1.20) 
-0.69 
(-0.38) 
11.28*** 
(4.25) 
5.85 
(1.42) 
7.63% 
P4 -2.13 
(-1.31) 
-0.93 
(-0.50) 
4.18 
(1.36) 
-0.36 
(-0.07) 
3.38% 
P5 (most illiquid) -1.72 
(-0.76) 
-0.61 
(-0.26) 
3.54 
(0.98) 
1.00 
(0.20) 
-0.79% 
P1-P5 spread -3.83* 
(-1.94) 
-3.26* 
(-1.81) 
15.56*** 
(7.17) 
12.21*** 
(4.90) 
7.87% 
Panel B: RtoTR-sorted portfolios 
P1 (most liquid) -4.57 
(-1.57) 
-1.67 
(-0.64) 
15.82*** 
(6.32) 
10.95*** 
(2.66) 
6.72% 
P2 -4.72* 
(-1.80) 
-2.39 
(-0.90) 
16.71*** 
(4.61) 
10.74* 
(1.86) 
7.76% 
P3 -2.68 
(-1.38) 
-1.98 
(-1.01) 
12.55*** 
(3.66) 
5.28 
(0.95) 
8.87% 
P4 -2.30 
(-1.18) 
-0.83 
(-0.43) 
7.30*** 
(2.76) 
3.91 
(1.07) 
2.61% 
P5 (most illiquid) -2.49 
(-1.19) 
-0.93 
(-0.39) 
0.61 
(0.18) 
-2.05 
(-0.41) 
-0.11% 
P1-P5 spread -2.07* 
(-1.23) 
-0.74 
(-0.55) 
15.21*** 
(8.11) 
13.00*** 
(5.85) 
11.25% 
 
Notes: This Table presents the estimates from least squares regressions of liquidity-sorted equally-weighted portfolio 
returns (rp,d) on expected (Δi
e) and unexpected (Δiu) 3-month LIBOR changes on BoE MPC meeting days during the 
period June 1999- December 2012 (164 MPC meetings), according to the model below: 
, 1 2 1 2(1 ) (1 )
u Crisis u u Crisis u e Crisis e e Crisis e
p d d d d d d d d d dr D i D i D i D i                 .  
In this case, D
Crisis
 is consistent with a narrower definition of the crisis and takes the value 1 on MPC meetings from 
September 2008 to March 2009 and 0 otherwise. Firms listed on LSE are classified into quintile portfolios on the basis of 
their Return-to-Volume (RtoV, Panel A) or Return-to-Turnover Rate (RtoTR, Panel B) price impact ratio calculated using 
60 trading days prior to the MPC meeting. Portfolio P1 contains the most liquid shares, while P5 contains the most 
illiquid shares. The corresponding estimates for the spread return between the most liquid and the most illiquid portfolios 
(P1-P5) are also reported. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for the 
estimated coefficients using Newey-West standard errors. 
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Table 10: Response of liquidity-sorted equally-weighted portfolio returns to rate changes using 
additional control variables 
 
 
Panel A: RtoV-sorted portfolios 
Portfolio (1 )u Crisisi D   (1 )e Crisisi D   u Crisisi D  e Crisisi D  
2  adj.R  
P1 (most liquid) -9.59*** 
(-2.08) 
-5.92** 
(-2.22) 
12.35*** 
(3.10) 
11.96*** 
(2.69) 
20.66% 
P2 -8.80*** 
(-2.92) 
-3.47 
(-1.54) 
7.21* 
(1.81) 
8.24* 
(1.80) 
22.45% 
P3 -4.61** 
(-2.38) 
-1.68 
(-1.08) 
4.90* 
(1.93) 
4.94* 
(1.79) 
26.60% 
P4 -4.13*** 
(-2.62) 
-1.84 
(-1.16) 
-0.50 
(-0.17) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
23.64% 
P5 (most illiquid) -4.06* 
(-1.86) 
-1.15 
(-0.53) 
-2.71 
(-0.85) 
-0.55 
(-0.17) 
17.46% 
P1-P5 spread -5.52** 
(-2.40) 
-4.77*** 
(-3.18) 
15.07*** 
(5.88) 
12.51*** 
(5.88) 
10.54% 
Panel B: RtoTR-sorted portfolios 
P1 (most liquid) -8.24*** 
(-2.57) 
-3.26 
(-1.33) 
9.35*** 
(2.85) 
9.49*** 
(2.70) 
19.98% 
P2 -8.33** 
(-2.93) 
-4.21* 
(-1.86) 
9.22** 
(2.24) 
9.85** 
(2.16) 
25.36% 
P3 -5.62*** 
(-2.92) 
-3.19* 
(-1.89) 
5.27*** 
(1.59) 
4.26 
(1.11) 
29.85% 
P4 -4.50** 
(-2.40) 
-1.78 
(-1.07) 
2.46 
(0.95) 
3.45 
(1.33) 
18.30% 
P5 (most illiquid) -4.50** 
(-2.23) 
-1.62 
(-0.76) 
-5.05 
(-1.69)* 
-2.42 
(-0.73) 
21.23% 
P1-P5 spread -3.73** 
(-1.97) 
-1.64 
(-1.27) 
14.40*** 
(7.74) 
11.91*** 
(6.12) 
15.94% 
 
Notes: This Table presents the estimates from least squares regressions of liquidity-sorted equally-weighted portfolio 
returns (rp,d) on expected (Δi
e) and unexpected (Δiu) 3-month LIBOR changes on BoE MPC meeting days during the 
period June 1999- December 2012 (164 MPC meetings), according to the model below:  
, 1 2 1 2(1 ) (1 ) '
u Crisis u u Crisis u e Crisis e e Crisis e
p d d d d d d d d d d dr D i D i D i D i X                   . 
Xd represents the vector of additional explanatory variables including the daily change in the log sterling pound/ US dollar 
exchange rate, the daily change in the log sterling pound/ Euro exchange rate as well as the lagged return on the US 
market, as proxied by the daily change in the log S&P 500 index. D
Crisis
 takes the value 1 on MPC meetings from August 
2007 to March 2009 and 0 otherwise. Firms listed on LSE are classified into quintile portfolios on the basis of their 
Return-to-Volume (RtoV, Panel A) or Return-to-Turnover Rate (RtoTR, Panel B) price impact ratio calculated using 60 
trading days prior to the MPC meeting. Portfolio P1 contains the most liquid shares, while P5 contains the most illiquid 
shares. The corresponding estimates for the spread return between the most liquid and the most illiquid portfolios (P1-P5) 
are also reported. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, for the estimated 
coefficients using Newey-West standard errors. 
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Table 11: Response of liquidity-sorted equally-weighted portfolio returns to changes in the  
LIBOR-BoE base rate spread  
 
 
Panel A: RtoV-sorted portfolios 
Portfolio   Δ(LIBOR-BoE rate)     2  adj.R  
 
P1 (most liquid) 
 
-2.13*** 
(-3.04) 
 
7.53% 
P2 -1.47** 
(-2.15) 
3.57% 
P3 -1.26** 
(-2.33) 
5.52% 
P4 -0.93** 
(-2.12) 
3.61% 
P5 (most illiquid) -0.90*** 
(-2.75) 
2.16% 
P1-P5 spread 
 
 
-1.22** 
(-2.47) 
4.18% 
Panel B: RtoTR-sorted portfolios 
 
P1 (most liquid) 
 
-1.68*** 
(-2.85) 
 
5.61% 
P2 -1.83** 
(-2.50) 
6.59% 
P3 -1.61*** 
(-2.64) 
7.24% 
P4 -0.81** 
(-2.04) 
2.26% 
P5 (most illiquid) -0.75** 
(-2.11) 
1.68% 
P1-P5 spread -0.93** 
(-2.34) 
3.80% 
 
 
Notes: This Table presents the estimates from least squares regressions of liquidity-sorted equally-weighted 
portfolio returns (rp,d) on the change in the spread between the 3-month LIBOR (L) and the BoE Base rate 
(B) on BoE MPC meeting days during the period June 1999-December 2012 (164 MPC meetings), 
according to the model below:  
, (  )
spread
p d d dr LIBOR BoE rate       . 
Δ(LIBOR-BoE rate)d stands for the change in the spread on meeting day d over the previous trading day    
d-1. Firms listed on LSE are classified into quintile portfolios on the basis of their Return-to-Volume 
(RtoV, Panel A) or Return-to-Turnover Rate (RtoTR, Panel B) price impact ratio calculated using 60 
trading days prior to the MPC meeting. Portfolio P1 contains the most liquid shares, while P5 contains the 
most illiquid shares. The corresponding estimates for the spread return between the most liquid and the 
most illiquid portfolios (P1-P5) are also reported. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively, for the estimated coefficients using Newey-West standard errors. 
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                Figure 1: Changes in LIBOR and unexpected interest rate changes 
 
 
Notes: This Figure presents the daily changes in 3-month LIBOR as well as the corresponding unexpected interest rate changes, relative to expectations embedded in 
3-month LIBOR futures prices, on BoE MPC meeting days during the period June 1999-December 2012 (164 MPC meetings). 
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      Figure 2: LIBOR-BoE base rate spread 
 
 
Notes: This Figure presents the LIBOR-BoE base rate spread, on BoE MPC meeting days during the period June 1999-December 2012 (164 MPC meetings). 
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